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Summary
Network-centric warfare (NCW) is the Navy’s central concept for organizing its
efforts to transform itself for military operations in the 21st Century.  NCW focuses on
using information technology (IT) to link together Navy ships, aircraft, and shore
installations into highly integrated networks.  It could significantly improve U.S. naval
capabilities and lead to substantial changes in naval tactics, doctrine, and organization.
Key programs for implementing NCW include the Cooperative Engagement Capability
(CEC), the IT-21 program, and the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI).  Congress has
closely followed and expressed concern for some NCW programs, particularly NMCI.
This report may be updated if developments warrant.
Network-Centric Warfare
The concept of network-centric warfare (NCW) emerged in 1997 and has become
the Navy’s central concept for organizing its efforts to change and transform itself for 21st
Century military operations.  NCW focuses on using advanced information technology
(IT) – computers, high-speed data links, and networking software – to link together Navy
ships, aircraft, and shore installations into highly integrated  computer/telecommunications
networks.  Within these networks, ships, aircraft, and shore installations will share large
amounts of critical information on a rapid and continuous basis.  The Navy believes that
NCW will dramatically improve Navy combat capability and efficiency by helping the fleet
to achieve "speed of  command" (an ability to generate and execute commands at much
higher speeds), which will permit U.S. naval forces to outpace adversary decisionmaking
and thereby "lock-out" (i.e., foreclose) potential adversary strategies:
Reliance on NCW is at the heart of the current C4I [command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence] efforts in the Department of the Navy....
Network Centric Warfare increases the speed, precision, and effectiveness of Naval
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discussions of NCW, see Alberts, David S., et al.  Network Centric Warfare, Developing and
Leveraging Information Superiority.  Washington, Department of Defense, 1999.  256 p.;
Cipriano, Joseph R.  A Fundamental Shift in the Business of Warfighting.  Sea Power, March
1999: 39-42; Bender, Bryan.  Buying Into Networked Warfare.  Jane's Defence Weekly, May 13,
1998; West, Leslie.  Network-Centric Warfare Realizes Its Promise.  Sea Power, March 1998: 38-
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Future.  U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1998: 28-35; Holzer, Robert.  Navy Speeds
Toward Centralized Information System.  Navy Times, November 24, 1997: 35.
2 In very simplified form, a CEC installation on a ship or aircraft includes an antenna for receiving
and transmitting radar data and a computer processor (with CEC software) for processing received
radar data and fusing it with radar data collected by the ship’s or aircraft’s own radars.  Procuring
and installing a CEC system costs a few to several million dollars per ship or aircraft.
3 Statement of The Honorable John W. Douglass, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Development and Acquisition), et al, op. cit., p. 20.
forces.  NCW enables the Navy to attain information superiority, mass effects instead
of forces, and disrupt the enemy's ability to carry out its strategy.1
Key NCW Programs
The Navy’s effort to implement NCW involves several IT procurement efforts.  Key
among these are the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) program, the IT-21
investment strategy, and the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI).  Each of these is
discussed below.
CEC.  The Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system links U.S. Navy ships
and aircraft operating in a particular area into a single, integrated air-defense network in
which radar data collected by each platform is transmitted on a real-time (i.e.,
instantaneous) basis to the other units in the network.2  Each unit in the CEC network
fuses its own radar data with data received from the other units.  As a result, units in the
network share a common, composite, real-time air-defense picture.  CEC will permit a ship
to shoot air-defense missiles at incoming anti-ship missiles that the ship itself cannot see,
using radar targeting data gathered by other ships and aircraft.  It will also permit air-
defense missiles fired by one ship to be guided by other ships or aircraft.  The Navy has
stated that CEC is a "central element" of NCW that "provides a revolutionary
improvement in battle group air and missile defense capability....  CEC also has promising
potential for Joint Service application with systems such as [the] Army Patriot [surface-to-
air missile system] and the Air Force Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)."3
Then-Secretary of Defense William Perry strongly endorsed the system in 1994 and
told the Navy to accelerate it.  The system achieved further impressive results in early
1996 in a test known as Mountain Top and was granted certification for initial operational
capability (IOC) at the end of FY1996.  The Navy wants to install the system on its aircraft
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Lockheed Martin At Odds Over Proposed CEC Changes.  Inside the Navy, October 23, 2000;
Holzer, Robert.  Critics Dispute Findings of Tactical Study.  Defense News, October 16, 2000: 14.
carriers, Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers, selected amphibious ships, and E-2C
Hawkeye carrier-based airborne early warning aircraft over the next several years.4
Tests of CEC aboard Navy ships in 1998 revealed significant interoperability (i.e.,
compatibility) problems between the CEC system’s software and the software of the air-
defense systems on some ships, particularly surface combatants equipped with the Baseline
6 version (the most recent version) of the Navy’s Aegis air defense system.  In response
to these problems, the Navy restructured its CEC testing and implementation schedule and
undertook a major two-year effort, now completed, to identify, understand, and fix the
problems.  The CEC system, with the new fixes, passed its technical evaluation
(TECHEVAL) testing in February and March 2001 and final operational evaluation
(OPEVAL) testing in April and May 2001.5
Navy officials have acknowledged  that the CEC system (and NCW in general) will
place strains on the limited data-transmission bandwidth capability6 currently available to
the Navy.  One contractor has proposed modifying CEC with a capability called the
Tactical Component Network (TCN).  Advocates of TCN argue that incorporating it into
CEC will reduce the bandwidth required by CEC without reducing CEC effectiveness.7
IT-21.  IT-21, which stands for IT for the 21st Century, is the Navy’s investment
strategy for procuring the desktop computers, data links, and networking software needed
to establish an intranet for transmitting tactical and administrative data within and between
Navy ships.  The IT-21 network uses commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) desktop
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computers and networking software and will provide a multimedia (text, data, graphics,
images, voice, and video) organizational intranet similar to the Capitol Hill intranet or
corporate intranets.  The Navy has testified that "This IT infrastructure is essential to
realizing the Department's shift” to NCW.8  The IT-21 concept originated in the Pacific
Fleet in 1995-1996.  The Navy plans to link most of the fleet into the IT-21 intranet within
the next few years.  The Navy believes IT-21 will significantly improve U.S. naval
warfighting capability and achieve substantial cost reductions by significantly reducing the
time and number of people required to carry out various tactical and administrative
functions.9
NMCI.  The Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) is a corporate-style intranet that
will link together Navy and Marine Corps shore installations in much the same way that
the IT-21 effort will link together Navy ships.  When completed in 2003, the NMCI will
include a total of about 360,000 computer work stations, or “seats,” at scores of Navy and
Marine Corps installations in the continental United States, Hawaii, Guam, Puerto Rico,
Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), and Iceland.10  In October 2000, the Navy announced that it had
awarded an industry team led by Electronic Data Systems (EDS) Corporation a $6.9
billion contract for installing , supporting, and periodically upgrading the NMCI over the
next 8 years.11  The first 42,000 NMCI seats at 29 sites have been installed, and the system
is scheduled to be fully implemented over the next year or two.  Navy officials are
considering whether to eventually merge the IT-21 and NMCI efforts.12
The 106th Congress expressed concern over the difficulty of identifying the total cost
of the NMCI effort in Navy budget documents,13 the Navy’s ability to finance NMCI effort
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without disrupting other important Navy programs,14 the pace at which the Navy planned
to implement NMCI,15 the Navy’s ability to properly structure and manage the huge NMCI
contract (the largest networking-services IT contract undertaken by a federal agency),16
the potential impact of NMCI implementation on employees of current naval networking
and telecommunications systems,17 and whether the network should be extended to cover
installations in the Marine Corps, which already has its own service-wide network.
In response, the Navy took actions to improve the visibility of NMCI costs in its
budget, stated that the NMCI would be financed to a large degree using funds
programmed for older IT procurement programs that the NMCI will supercede, stated that
implementing NMCI would have only a small net employment impact, and argued that
implementing NMCI in the Marine Corps as well as the Navy would result in greater
efficiencies and lower overall costs for the two services.  At Congress’ direction, the plan
for implementing NMCI was restructured to begin with a smaller number of initial
installations, so that the success of the NMCI effort could be more carefully assessed
before the program is expanded to cover larger parts of the Navy and the Marine Corps.
Issues for Congress
Potential issues for the 107th Congress pertaining to NCW include the following:
Tracking implementation of NMCI.   Potential NMCI issues concern the success
of the initial NMCI installation efforts, whether funding requirements for the program are
displacing other high-priority Navy or Marine Corps efforts, and whether installations
using NMCI are achieving the kinds of improvements in operational efficiency that NMCI
advocates have projected.  The conference report (H.Rept. 107-333 of December 12,
2001) on the FY2002 defense authorization act (S. 1438/P.L. 107-107) contains a
provision (Section 362) that permits the Navy to proceed with the NMCI project after
meeting certain testing requirements.  The provision also requires the Navy to submit to
Congress a report on the scope and status of NMCI testing and the implementation of the
NMCI network, and to identify a single individual whose sole responsibility will be to
direct and oversee the NMCI program.  The provision also requires GAO to study the
CRS-6
18 Keeter, Hunter.  New Numbers Show Reduced Buy For Navy CEC Program, $3.7 Billion Total
Cost.  Defense Daily, December 21, 2000: 5.
19 For a survey of potential issues relating to NCW, see Jenik, Douglas A.  Beyond the Rose-
Colored Glasses.  U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 2000: 60-63; Barnett, Thomas P.
M.  The Seven Deadly Sins of Network-Centric Warfare.  U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
January 1999: 36-39.
20 See, for example, McCarter, Mickey.  Navy Marine Corps Intranet On Schedule To Fend Off
Cyber-Attacks.  Stars and Stripe Omnimedia, May 18, 2001.
impact of NMCI implementation on the rate structure of naval shipyards and other repair
depots.  The conferees expressed concern about delays in implementing the program and
the resulting shortage of data bout the viability and performance of NMCI.  (See pages 55-
57 and 641-642 of the conference report.)
Resolving implementation issues with CEC.  Issues include whether the
interoperability problems have been fully resolved, whether the Navy’s restructured
installation schedule is appropriate,18 and what, if anything, CEC implementation problems
reveal about the challenges of incorporating advanced IT into complex weapon systems.
Adequacy of transmission bandwidth for CEC.  Another issue is whether
TCN should be incorporated into CEC as part of the effort to manage limits on available
bandwidth, and what implications TCN would have for the evolution of, and acquisition
strategy for, the CEC system.
Questions concerning NCW in general.19  Congress may consider other
potential issues relating to NCW in general, including the following:
! Tactics, doctrine and organization:  The Navy recognizes that it needs
to develop new tactics, doctrine, and organizations to take full advantage
of NCW; this could significantly alter current practices, if not the
leadership culture itself, and pose challenges for retraining Navy
personnel.
! Overall fleet design: The Navy is currently adding NCW to an overall
fleet architecture that has evolved in a gradual fashion over the last
several decades.  The issue is whether the Navy has taken the relatively
new concept of NCW adequately into account in its thinking and planning
for future ship and aircraft designs and the future overall architecture of
the fleet.
! Allied interoperability:  If NATO and other allied navies invest in NCW-
enabling technologies, U.S.-allied naval interoperability (the ability to
operate together effectively in multinational efforts) could be significantly
increased; if they do not, maintaining naval interoperability could become
increasingly difficult.
! Information security: The Navy acknowledges that it needs to work on
measures for preventing, detecting, and responding to attempts by
outsiders to illegally enter the computer networks being created to
implement NCW.20
